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Since the Enlightenment, Western thought has emphasized the advancement 
of knowledge through reason and science. Early success in the natural sciences 
was admired and emulated in the social sciences. As recently as 1968, May 
Brodbeck wrote, "The possibility of a social science in principle as perfect as 
physics remains the unexamined premise of the vast majority of present-day 
scientists."' Indeed, during the past 2 centuries, the traditional domain of the 
humanities, the study of people and society, has been increasingly encroached 
on by scientists. With Auguste Comte's nineteenth-century formulation of 
sociology (also originally called social physics), a science of society was envisioned 
in which explanations of human phenomena would be based on scientific 
laws verified through empirical and logical methods. This extension of the 
principles and methods of the natural sciences to the study of people and 
society was elaborated especially in the tenets of logical positivists in the 1920s 
and early 1930s. However, as early as the late nineteenth century, others such 
as Wilhelm Dilthey proposed an approach to human science quite different 
from that of the natural sciences. For Dilthey, a philosopher of history and 
culture, the focus was on human life as experienced in its unique complexity. 
Central to achieving understanding is the effort of sympathy (Verstehen) by 
the knower. The older philosophy of hermeneutics was extended by Dilthey 
as the methodology for all of the social sciences as well as the humanities. 
Although others before Dilthey (e.g., Johann von Herder) as well as after 
Dilthey (e.g., Karl Popper) argued for a separate approach to historical studies 
that eschewed the notion of historical laws, Dilthey extended his view of histori- 
cal method to all of the human sciences. Accordingly, while positive science set 
human studies on a course with close ties to the natural sciences, hermeneutics 
moved human sciences away from the natural sciences and into the humani- 
ties. Ernest Nagel's proposal that interpretive methods such as Verstehen be 
valued as exploratory methods for gaining insight preliminary to the use of 
objective methods for verification has not resolved this debate. Advocates of 
a human science distinct from the methods of the natural sciences view the 
approaches to be incommensurable. These divergences continue into contem- 
porary philosophy of social science debates without resolution. 
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It is in the historical context of these divergences that Gurpreet Mahajan 
critically analyzes explanation and understanding in the social sciences. Her 
approach is consistent with those who have historically argued for a human 
science with methods distinct from those of the natural sciences. Four ap- 
proaches to scientific explanation and understanding in the social sciences are 
examined. The mode associated with logical positivism, causal explanation, is 
reviewed and found to be insufficient for the social sciences. The second 
approach, reason-action explanation, is among the oldest forms of explanation. 
Agreeing with common sense, it is the notion that the explanation for a human 
action is the reason given by the agent. Hermeneutic understanding, as originally 
formulated by Dilthey and subsequently proposed by Hans-Georg Gadamer 
and Paul Ricoeur, is contrasted with causal explanation as well as reason- 
action explanation. Following W. B. Gallie, Arthur C. Danto, and William 
Dray, the narrative mode is discussed last. While there are several versions of 
the narrative mode, Dray has proposed that an event is explained when one 
can "trace the course of events by which it came about."2 Mahajan presents 
each of these four modes as framing the object of inquiry differently and 
asking qualitatively different questions. After an analysis of each of these four 
modes, Mahajan, taking a relativistic stance, concludes, "Since there is no 
theoretical grid from which we can view the world in itself and write its history, 
we must allow points of view that offer new insights and uncover different 
aspects of reality some space to exist" (p. 101). 
Mahajan's thesis is that logical positivism established causal explanation as 
the goal of all science, including the study of people and society. For Mahajan, 
this focus has resulted in a reductionistic science when applied to human 
science phenomena. Mahajan's discussion of causal explanation in the social 
sciences repeats frequently expressed limitations including Carl Hempel's ob- 
servation that, because the social sciences are unable to specify general laws, 
complete xplanations of events are not provided in social science research. 
Mahajan presents the now familiar and widely accepted argument that any 
notion of causation implying necessary and sufficient conditions for the occur- 
rence of an event is inappropriate for the social sciences. It is easily accepted 
that in the social sciences even contingently necessary conditions are scarce, 
and, indeed, most events have multiple possible causes and can be said to be 
overdetermined. Especially pertinent to applied fields is Mahajan's conclusion 
that, because these causal conditions are subject to considerable variation in the 
social sciences, the notion of complete prediction is untenable. Accordingly, 
Mahajan believes that causal explanation is thus undermined as a guide to 
future action. This discussion of causal explanation in the social sciences adds 
little to the extensive literature already available on the subtleties of causation, 
a most elusive topic for both philosophers and researchers alike. Clearly, 
neither David Hume nor the logical positivists were enamored with the meta- 
physical connotations of the term. Few contemporary social scientists, whether 
positivist or not, would take exception to Mahajan's major point, which is 
that answers to causal why questions in the social sciences are difficult to 
unequivocally generate and that, typically, social scientists are interested in 
answering questions beyond causation including other perspectives on why as 
well as questions pertaining to who, what, and when of social phenomena. 
However, many social scientists would take exception to Mahajan's failure 
to stress the significance of statistical-probabilistic explanation, which adds 
considerably to social science understanding and prediction. 
While adopting a pluralistic view, Mahajan asserts that the causal mode of 
explanation is especially inadequate for the social sciences because human 
action and meanings attributed to those actions are the subject matter. The 
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significance of the hermeneutic mode lies in its distinctive conception of social 
reality, history, and knowledge. Mahajan believes that the narrative mode 
should be contingently privileged so long as it is creatively informed by herme- 
neutic philosophy. The narrative is valued by Mahajan because it individual- 
izes human action, it considers the actions of multiple agents, it addresses the 
why question, and it recognizes the influence of both the interpreter (re- 
searcher) as well as the contemporary context on the description provided. In 
addition, the narrative mode is presented as transcending the dichotomies 
inherent in both causal explanation (and, to some extent, in hermeneutics) 
pertaining to such dimensions as knower and known, subject and object, exter- 
nal conditions and intentionality, description and explanation, understanding 
and explanation, and subjective and objective analysis. Mahajan suggests that 
this narrative transcendence results in a refiguration of the prefigured world. 
Beyond methodological considerations, she also notes political implications of 
the narrative mode: 
The narrative is essentially a signifier of a new type of politics and a protest against 
the dominant rationality of the Enlightenment. In place of a single pattern of individual, 
social and historical development, it stresses difference: indeed, it celebrates difference. 
And it is this celebration that finds an expression in its emphasis on the study of history 
and conception of historical events as unique particulars. ... Presenting a narrative of 
particular events, groups and communities, and bringing into social discourse voices 
that had often been suppressed or marginalized, it has helped to empower these groups 
and place them in the mainstream of political life. ... Convincing and adequate accounts 
of events written from the point of view of specific groups-e.g., women and peas- 
ants-can be placed beside one another, not because they supplement each other but 
because they reveal the complexity of our historical being and disclose the limitations 
of each account. .. As we privilege the narrative contingently, we must take cognizance 
of these political implications and place them along with other methodological considera- 
tions. [Pp. 101-2] 
Mahajan's study is a useful addition to the reference works available to 
those wishing to give serious consideration to these epistemological questions. 
She presents a strong argument for the relevance of qualitative, interpretive 
methods to many social science and social work questions. Although Mahajan 
avoids rejection of traditional quantitative-objectivistic methods that seek gen- 
eral causal explanations, her emphasis is clear. Mahajan prefers the term 
human sciences, yet her notion of scientific method seems narrowly restrictive 
in contingently privileging the narrative mode. As attractive as the methods 
of the humanities are for gaining insight into human affairs, it would be quite 
myopic to lose sight of the past and potential contributions of quantitative, 
controlled scientific methods to explanation and understanding in the social 
sciences and social work. Clearly, social work's research capacity is meager, 
and, despite rhetoric to the contrary, there is little danger that positivistically 
driven research will overcome the profession. What is possible is that a failure 
to nourish the meager research effort already present in the profession could 
result in a continued fading of the credibility of the profession. A sincere and 
strong valuing of efforts to engage in scholarly efforts to expand explanation 
and understanding of both quantitative and qualitative as well as nomothetic 
and ideographic types of research is critically important. A pluralistic stance 
is necessary; explanation and understanding of important social science and 
social work concerns may be advanced through a variety of routes. Regretta- 
bly, Mahajan's work does not provide that balance. Nevertheless, Mahajan's 
essay is a compact review of alternate models developed in literary and histori- 
cal disciplines. 
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It has often been said that philosophers of science and researchers proceed 
independently, with different interests and different methods. Philosophers, on 
the one hand, are said to reconstruct idealizations of how science should be 
conceptualized, with periodic reference to observations of the actual conduct of 
science. Scientists, on the other hand, are thought to be driven less by philosophi- 
cal abstractions as to how they should do their research than by practical interest 
in answering research questions. Because scientific activity is dynamic and rapidly 
changing, it is assumed that philosophers of science necessarily must attend 
to contemporary scientific work to avoid complete irrelevance. However, these 
characterizations of the separate worlds of philosophers and researchers appear 
to be breaking down, at least for social scientists. The research literature is now 
replete with philosophical discussions, written not by philosophers but by working 
researchers. This is because the philosophical issues are being framed in such a 
way as to create alternatives for the selection of research questions and research 
methods. Accordingly, it is now unlikely that researchers will be able to proceed 
unencumbered by these philosophical considerations even as they continue to 
pursue answers to pragmatic questions. Clearly, as new generations of researchers 
are educated, the interface of philosophy of science and research methods cannot 
be and should not be ignored. Researchers would do well to keep an eye toward 
developments in the philosophy of science such as those presented in Mahajan's 
essay. And although many philosophers and scientists would agree with Maha- 
jan's argument for different scientific models for the natural and the social sci- 
ences, it is likely that, as in the past, developments in the natural sciences will 
continue to contribute to the shaping of social science research. Concurrently, 
literary analysis and interpretive methods nurtured in the humanities will surely 
enrich attempts to illuminate the meaning of human action. Their potential for 
contribution to descriptive science is significant. When it comes to expanding 
and enriching explanation and understanding of human actions, there is much 
to be learned from perspectives and methods developed in the humanities and 
the natural sciences, as well as those more traditionally associated with the social 
sciences. For social work, a profession concerned with improving the human 
condition, understanding the past through historical methods is useful only to 
the extent general explanations of human events can provide understanding that 
will guide future action. Neither reason-action nor hermeneutic modes address 
questions that can provide such understanding. Clearly, questions addressed in 
the causal explanation mode are pertinent to social work concerns, and the 
profession's research knowledge base has benefited considerably from answers 
to causal questions. It is likely that causal explanations will continue to serve the 
profession well. As valuable as the hermeneutic and narrative modes are for 
gaining insight into the meaning of many social phenomena, especially in the 
study of historical events, they cannot establish causal explanations. Without 
causal explanation, the social sciences and social work would offer little to a 
society searching to prevent and ameliorate social problems and little to the 
improvement of the human condition. 
Edward J. Mullen 
Columbia University 
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